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Regional Energy Development 
In Comparative Federal Systerll'fRSffY OF MONTANA 
AUG 29 1974 
LIBRARY 
by Lauren S. McKinsey and Louis D. Hayes* 
Introduction 
In a recent article William Riker described federalism as, 
perhaps, nothing more than a constitutional legal fiction, a 
figment of the imagination of academics. I According to his 
argument, a state exercises only those powers which the 
national government allows. The national government 
remains the final arbiter of what authority the state possesses 
and how that authority may be exercised. This is not an en-
couraging perspective for Montanans who support the ef-
forts of their state government to control the development of 
energy resources. Since these resources are increasingly 
viewed as vital to the nation as a whole, Riker's argument 
would lead to the conclusion that state-federal confrontation 
over resource development will result in further cen-
tralization of national authority. Resistance by Montana 
can only increase intergovernmental tension and result in 
unproductive isolationism. 
Another possibility is suggested by the experience of 
Alberta in the Canadian federal system. Although well en-
dowed with energy reserves, Alberta has not yet been vic-
timized by nationally 'dictated energy policy. This is due in 
large measure to the configuration of the Canadian federal 
system. Comparison of conditions in Montana and Alberta 
may illustrate some of the possible consequences of the 
intenisfying competition for decreasing supplies of energy 
resources. 
Comparative Framework 
Citizens of the United States are poorly informed about 
life and politics in Canada. This holds true even in Montana, 
a border state which has interests in common with 
neighboring Canadian provinces. Only rarely have events 
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focused attention on the fact of territorial contiguity. But the 
energy crisis has produced awareness of many critical issues 
in the United States. The possibility of continued exponen-
tial economic growth in the face of finite resources has 
been questioned. One result has been recognition of facts 
concerning Canadian-American interdependency. 
Americans are becoming aware of the significance of the fact 
that Canada, not Japan, is the leading trading partner of the 
United States; that the U.S. imports more petroleum from 
Canada than from the Middle East. Growing energy 
demands coupled with problems of interruptions in sup-
ply- particularly of Middle Eastern oil-have placed 
greater impOi'tance on the resources of both western Canada 
and the western United States. While Canada's petroleum 
reserves are sought to help alleviate short term U.S . 
shortages, coal and oil shale in western states are viewed as a 
means to ultimate energy self-sufficiency in this country. 
To the extent that the resources of Montana and Alberta 
are regarded as complimentary solutions to the U.S. energy 
problem, mutual interests are likely to emerge. Common res-
ponses of the respective regional governments to national 
pressures could lead eventually to variations of "resource 
regionalism." Such localization of interest is possible and 
more likely to survive under federalism than under other 
kinds of national political systems. Whereas unitary systems 
respond to national constituencies, federalism, theoretically, 
allows parochial interests to exist to greater or lesser degrees. 
It follows, therefore, that in federal systems the interest of 
the center and the periphery are often incongruent. In the 
area of natural resource utilization, divisions of interest 
between areas that are primarily producers and those that 
are consumers have existed for some time. But the response 
of the energy producing areas to the increasing energy 
demands of the nation as a whole may produce conflicts 
which cannot be handled by existing federal structures. 
Demands of energy production, energy consumption and 
environmental protection may also necessitate 
· intergovernmental relationships which federalism has not 
fully anticipated. 
As the major source of Canada's indigenous supply of oil 
and natural gas, Alberta is subject to a variety of pressures. 
Since satisfaction of national energy demand depends 
heavily upon one province, the possibility of federal 
bargaining is restricted. Furthermore, with over 80% of the 
Albertan petroleum industry controlled by foreign 
corporations-primarily U.S.- the profit incentives of 
non-Canadian interests exert influence on Canadian energy 
policy. Finally, the need to produce revenue for the province 
adds another complicating pressure. 
When the opportunity to sell oiho the United States at 
high and potentially higher prices is presented, Albertans 
and all Canadians are faced with hard choices. Alberta's 
neighboring provinces also have an interest in a regional 
energy policy that can maximize benefits from their 
positions as energy producers. Across the border, Montana 
is sensitive to shifts in price or policy that affect the flow of 
Alberta's natural gas to the state. For Alberta and the 
Canadian federal system, therefore, a variety of relation-
ships are brought to light by growing concern with energy is-
sues. 
Montana has yet to experience comparable energy 
resource development. Present levels of coal production are 
insignificant by comparison with the anticipated 
development of the vast resources of the Fort Union Basin. 
The pressure on Montana may be reduced, however, because 
of the availability of significant sources of coal in Wyoming 
and North Dakota. In addition, the Green River oil shale 
formation of Wyoming, Colorado and Utah offers a major 
alternative to coal development. Among the western states, 
therefore, a mixture of conflict, competition and 
cooperation is likely to characterize the politics of energy 
development. 
The possibility may exist for development of an 
international energy region. If Montanans and Albertans 
perceive themselves to be exploited to meet the energy 
demands of industrial population centers of the two na-
tions, they may come to identify with one another. Shared 
interests may have little effect on respective federal pat-
terns but state-provincial contacts are likely to be more 
frequent. 
Structural Interaction 
The institutional matrix within which energy policy is 
made is extraordinarily complex. Policy affecting Montana 
and Alberta is developed on six levels. The state and provin-
cial governments themselves lie at the base. The next level 
comprises the relations between these governments and the 
governments of neighboring states or provinces which are 
also involved in energy production. For Montana these in-
clude North Dakota, Wyoming and Colorado; for Alberta, 
t~ey consist of British Columbia and Saskatchewan. The 
third level is the relatively undeveloped relationship between 
the states on the one hand and the provinces on the other. 
The fourth level consists of the federal or national 
governmental units- essentially the United States Congress 
and the Canadian Parliament. Input at this level comes from 
three main sources: first, from state/ provincial interests 
developed primarily through their legislative delegations; 
second, from the President or Prime Minister and the top 
policy people around them; and third, from the functional 
agencies described below. 
The fifth level is often not highly visible but is one of the 
more important in policy determination. In the United 
States, this includes a multitude of functional administrative 
agencies such as the Bureau of Mines, Bureau of 
Reclamation and Bureau of Land Management. The 
Canadian situation is considerably less complicated with 
regard to energy development per se. But because energy 
policy is tied to a wide variety of other policies-more so 
than in the United States-the influence of other functional 
agencies complicates interactions. These U.S. and Canadian 
agencies are responsible for routine government business in 
specific substantive areas, and they have their own parochial 
interests in and influence upon the development of policy. 
The states and provinces have parallel networks of ad-
ministrative agencies that complicate the process. 
The final level is the international dimension, i.e., United 
States-Canadian relations and the international en-
vironment in which they exist. This network includes multi-
national corporations, Middle East producer countries, and 
European demand patterns among its most obvious 
elements. It is instructive to think of the U.S.-Canadian 
relationship in energy development as another variety of 
neo-colonialism. Center-periphery patterns can be seen 
which operate as though the two nations were themselves 
part of an additional federal structure. While Canada is a 
sovereign state, it is highly vulnerable to U.S. demands and 
pressures. In fact, Canada's position vis a vis the U.S. is, in 
some respects, weaker than that of a state in a formal 
federal system. 
The operation of this six-layered matrix will not only 
determine the character of energy policy affecting Montana 
and Alberta but will affect the very nature of their respective 
federal systems. Some of these relationships have become 
well-established over time, while others are latent or even 
conjectural. Almost daily, however, the pattern becomes 
more complicated as solutions to different aspects of the 
energy problem are sought. 
Four Federal Patterns 
Four identifiable patterns already exist in center-
periphery relationships concerning energy development 
policy: 1) resource isolation; 2) environmental protection; 3) 
economic benefit; and 4) cooperation. These patterns are 
usually found in various combinations in the policies of in-
dividual states or provinces. However, any one pattern may 
represent dominant opinion at a particular stage of policy 
development. 
Resource isolation. Isolationism has found expression in a 
variety of contexts. As a response to international 
imperialism, national isolationism involves the assertion 
that a nation's raw materials should be used for the benefit of 
that nation's growth and progress. Among underdeveloped 
nations, this attitude is finding greater currency. Understan-
dably, the developed nations are uncomfortable with this 
new consciousness. 
In the United States, some energy-producing regions take 
the position that their needs should be met first when energy 
supplies run short. The oil-producing states on the Gulf of 
Mexico took this position during the height of the energy 
shortage last winter. Some attempted to reduce production 
in the belief that it was better to leave the oil in the ground for 
future state use. They argued that other parts of the country 
must develop their own resources even if it meant increased 
levels of pollution. Governor Edwin W. Edwards of 
Lousiana summarized the argument: "It'll do little good to 
tell Millie down at the funeral home that at least her husband 
froze to death in clean air."2 
In Canada, the prospects of freezing are real. A growing 
attitude of resource isolation reflects increasing Canadian 
awareness of that fact- and the realization that Canada's 
energy reserves are incapable of supporting a continental 
energy policy that can solve the long term energy 
requirements of the United States. One of Canada's most 
respected geophysicists and chairman of the Royal Society 
of Canada argued in the winter of 1972 that Canada's entire 
reserves could, at best, help the U.S. for only one or two 
years. He warned: 
"There is one thing Canadians should always remember. In 
many parts of the world including much of the southern United 
States people will be uncomfortable if heating fuel is cut off, but in 
Canada many people would die."J 
Resource isolationism takes on a different aspect when the 
producer is not also a major consumer, as in the Middle 
East. In this case resources may be kept in the ground 
until the price is right, not necessarily for later internal 
use. In effect, this approach also is a variation of the eco-
nomic advantage theme described below. 
Environmental protection. Environmental protection has 
a fairly brief history, and its advocates find allies among the 
resource isolationists. An environmental theme is difficult to 
develop, however, when a producer region is also a heavy 
consumer of its own resources or has come to depend on the 
revenue derived from their development. Where demand 
exceeds supply, as for the United States as a whole, the basic 
need for energy may preclude the possibility of effective 
environmental protection. 
In Montana, concern for environmental protection has 
been influenced by three factors: the state's experience with 
the effects of resource extraction in the past; the absence of 
energy-consuming secondary industry; and previous 
freedom from dependence on tax revenues produced by 
extractive industries. Oregon and Colorado provide other 
examples of western states presently emphasizing environ-
mental themes in the strategy of development. 
The population of these states includes a growing 
proportion of residents who have moved from areas of heavy 
industrial pollution and recognize that scenic and other 
esthetic values should be preserved. In effect, it is a coalition 
of groups and individuals both from within and outside the 
state of Montana that emphasizes environmental protection. 
However, this coalition may be incapable of resisting the 
force of economic incentives within the state. The balance 
will shift if the industrialization associated with coal 
development promotes a different kind of immigration into 
the state. 
Economic advantage. This approach implies that 
environmental or consumption tradeoffs are justified when 
the revenues derived from sale of resources are sufficiently 
high. Brazil, for example, welcomes industrial development 
and considers pollution an acceptable tradeoffforeconomic 
gain. Among the western states, Wyoming has attempted to 
exploit what may be a temporary position of economic 
advantage in its response to coal development. Extraction 
taxes were deliberately placed low to encourage the early 
development of industry in that state. 
When shortages existed during the winter of 197J-74, 
many regions that had previously been oriented toward 
economic advantage when resources were freely available 
adopted an isolationist stance. The power companies in 
these areas had previously attacked Federal Power 
Commission pricing policies as impeding expansion of the 
natural gas industry. Yet when shortages occurred, these 
same policies were supported for their effect "in keeping gas 
within the states- for consumption at prices far higher than 
interstate rates. 
At the present time, Alberta seems willing to sell to any 
customer. This policy is based on the growing market value 
of its petroleum and provincial dependence on royalties to 
relieve other tax pressures. This course can be followed only 
for as long as supply exceeds indigenous demand. As we 
have noted, Alberta does not subscribe to the policy that 
resources should be husbanded for eventual use within 
Canada. Conflict will emerge to the degree that Canada as a 
whole adopts.the conservationist view. 
Cooperative. According to this approach, the interest of 
state, province or region are not primary considerations in 
determining energy policy. Regional welfare is equated with 
national welfare, or national welfare with the concerns of the 
world. The Stockholm Conference of 1972 attempted to 
promote this perspective on a global scale. A continental 
energy policy for the United States and Canada would be 
consistent with this theme. Within the two federal systems, 
the center usually promotes the idea and the regions reject it. 
Current energy development policy in the United States 
reflects a cooperative strategy. The Nixon administration 
has articulated a philosophy of sharing the burden of the 
energy shortage and equalizing the impact of national 
industrial pollution (without necessarily abating it qverall). 
At the state level, North Dakota's present policy may be 
identified with the cooperative theme. In this case, however, 
it may be difficult to differentiate cooperation from an 
attempt to achieve economic gain. This approach is usually 
advocated in areas which have had little experience with the 
effects of a large scale resource extraction industry. 
The purely cooperative approach, therefore, may be the 
most ambiguous and least stable of the patterns. But in each 
of the areas identified, all of the approaches will remain in 
tension as the search for future energy sources continues. 
The following discussion focuses on the basis for the 
positions taken by Alberta and Montana and deals with 
conditions which may result from changes in those positions. 
Comparative Policies in 
Montana and Alberta 
Comparison of features of the American and Canadian 
federal systems in the context of energy development 
provides a broad field for speculation regarding future 
changes in those systems. Research should focus on several 
aspects of the positions taken by Alberta and Montana, 
respectively, within their federal frameworks. One thing is 
already clear: the acceleration of activities in both Montana 
and Alberta is diminishing the opportunity to make policy in 
a climate of understanding- policy that is beneficial to both 
nation and region. 
Alberta: Negotiation From Strength. Because of its 
stronger position as one of only ten provinces, and because 
of Canada's heavy reliance upon its energy resources, 
Alberta's position on the development of those resources will 
be a major factor in the federal policy equation. Montana's 
weak federal position, on the other hand, means that its 
interests are likely to be subordinated to those of the United 
States as a whole. In both cases, however, the outcome will 
affect the federal systems in matters other than the specific 
statuses of Montana and Alberta. 
Alberta's apparent position of strength is, nevertheless, 
paradoxical. The pressures on Alberta's residents and 
decision-makers are varied and intense. Alberta produces 
80% of Canada's present supply of oil and natural gas and 
could guarantee Canada's self-sufficiency. The Athabasca 
oil sands rival the oil potential of the Middle East. 4 Alberta's 
decision to sell remaining current supplies depends on its 
ability to bring oil sands plants into production before 
traditional energy reserves are depleted. 
A strong case can be made in Canada for a "cooperative 
federalism" that usually has not characterized Ottawa's 
relationships with the western provinces. Separatist threats 
in the western provinces are not of the same order as those in 
Quebec, but Alberta and British Columbia sometimes 
question the ·value of Canadian unity. Elements of a 
constitutional crisis were apparent in the federal-provincial 
energy conference in January 1974-a conference termed by 
one source "the most crucial meeting of its kind ever called" 
in Canada.s 
That meeting failed to resolve the central question, one 
whose elements must be reconsidered in the near future. On 
the face of it, the question is simple: to what extent, and in 
what manner should Alberta attempt to capitalize on the 
rising prices accompanying the increased demand for fuel? 
Two University of Alberta economists argue that increases 
in the well-head price of Alberta crude oil could constitute a 
net economic loss to Canada as a whole.6 They point out that 
while prices go up for Canadian consumers, petroleum 
industry profits accrue primarily to American-owned 
companies who pay low economic rent. 
The dynamics of the Canadian energy system help explain 
the federal implications of the issue. Canada is theoretically 
capable of energy self-sufficiency; it presently exports 
slightly more and imports slightly less than one million 
barrels of oil daily. But the absence of east-west pipeline 
facilities prevents Canada from benefiting from the nation's 
surplus. Consequently, eastern Canadian provinces must 
import foreign fuel at competitive world price levels which, 
in turn, stimulate higher prices for western Canadian 
producers. Except for certain tax equalization structures 
that partially redistribute national wealth, eastern Canada 
will not benefit from any price increases for Canadian 
petroleum. The decision to complete an east-west pipeline, 
therefore, will have two consequences: Canada can become 
self-sufficient in energy for the immediate future and eastern 
Canadian consumers will not have to pay inflated world 
prices. 
Alberta, and Canada, must decide whether continued 
export of energy resources is beneficial for the province and 
the nation. At the present rate of consumption, Canada's 
known traditional reserves can only supply U.S. petroleum 
demands for a few years. Present-day extractive methods 
could recover as much as 30 billion barrels of oil from the 
Athabasca oil sands-enough to supply Canada into the 
next century. Peak output, however, would supply only a 
fraction of daily U.S. demand. Alberta might expect sizeable 
income for perhaps a few more decades, but at the potential 
cost of Canada's long-range self-sufficiency. The continuous 
outflow of capital and increased foreign ownership of 
Canadian industry only serve to exacerbate fundamental 
problems of Canadian prosperity and national identity. 
The Canadian constitution clearly gives the provinces 
control over natural resources. Whether they have used this 
authority judiciously is another matter. One Canadian 
economist notes: 
"Resource development is within provincial jurisdiction and 
experience shows that the provinces favor maximum resource 
extraction in the shortest possible time and on the largest possible 
scale, without particular concern for the nationality of the 
interests to whom these resources are sold. "7 
But once a resource enters interprovincial or international 
commerce, federal authority is involved in a variety of ways. 
The federal government is responsible for dealing with 
national problems that derive in part from energy 
questions-full employment, trade, development of 
secondary industry, and inflation. Ottawa has responded by 
imposing export taxes to control windfall profits and to 
protect the economic climate in the rest of the nation. The 
immediate conflict between Alberta and Ottawa involves the 
distribution of the resulting revenue. Eventually, however, 
Canadians will have to decide whether the country can 
afford any further exportation of resources. The U.S. 
response to such a decision could permanently affect 
relations between the two countries. 
Before the recent fall of the government, rumors prevailed 
that both Prime Minister Trudeau and Alberta Premier 
Peter Lougheed would call elections on the energy question. 
The results of the July federal election, although called to 
settle a different issue, will exemplify strains placed on the 
Canadian federal system by the energy question. Trudeau 
has no support in the west that would be lost by taking a firm 
position on the energy issue and he may calculate that it will 
increase support for his Liberal government in the eastern 
provinces. The unknown variable may be Quebec, whose 
strong support Trudeau needs but whose governments have 
always been strongly committed to the principle of 
provincial autonomy that Alberta currently asserts. If these 
issues surface, the election could further divide Canada 
along east-west lines or, conceivably, promote a strange 
alliance of provinces with little in common but the principle 
of resistance to federal authority. The election and its 
aftermath could alter significantly the configuration of 
Canadian federalism. 
Montana: Bargaining at a Disadvantage. Montana's 
energy role in the American federal system presents a 
strikingly different picture. The state lacks sufficient 
national leverage to secure results which conform to 
Montanans' visions of its future. The predominant position 
of the national government is likely to determine the results 
of regional energy resource development. 
The state government has tried to establish ground rules 
for the development of Montana's portion of the Fort Union 
Basin coal reserves, estimated to be capable of supplying 
national energy needs well into the 21st century and perhaps 
beyond.8 Various bills introduced in the 1973 and 1974 
Montana Legislative Assemblies addressed questions 
related to coal development, among them strip mining 
reclamation, utility plant siting, taxation, and water use. On 
March 1, 1974, Governor Thomas L. Judge expressed fear 
that the federal government was attempting to preclude state 
options in these matters. "I take the position that this is very 
properly a matter of states rights to decide on how the land is 
going to be reclaimed and if power generation plants are 
going to be built and where they are going to be located."9 
If a national commitment is made to utilize coal as a major 
energy source, however, it is doubtful whether Montana will 
be able to resist the combined pressures of the federal 
government, industry and national public opinion. It is 
already evident that the federal government does not share 
Montana's views regarding optimum conditions for the rate 
and scope of coal development. President Nixon has pressed 
for relaxation of clean air standards that could lead to 
widespread use of coal in power-generating plants across the 
country. A once-imposing strip mine bill in Congress has 
been weakened by section-by-section amendment. 
By comparison with Alberta, Montana is the object of a 
greater diversity of pressures from federal government 
sources concerned with energy development. This results 
from the greater proliferation and autonomy of the boards, 
agencies, bureaus and departments in the U.S. federal 
bureaucracy. While Alberta can negotiate with the National 
Energy Board as the principal federal agent in energy 
dealings, Montana faces a plethora of federal agencies all 
seeking an important role in the development of coal 
reserves. The Bureau of Reclamation helped conduct the 
North Central power study that predicts eventual 
construction of 42 coal-fired steam generating plants in the 
Fort Union Basin. The Atomic Energy Commission is 
pressing hard to involve its demonstration reclamation 
project in the process. The Federal Power Commission, 
Bureau of Mines, Bureau of Indian Affairs and others are 
involved in various aspects of coal development. Because 
80% of the potential coal area is subject to federal mineral 
rights, the probability is very low that Montana can apply 
uniform and comprehensive coal development regulations 
which are significantly different from national policy 
expectations. 
Montana's environmental response structure is also 
fragmented in comparison to the close organization of 
Alberta's provincial government on energy questions. 
Decisions affecting the entire process of coal development 
are assigned to various state agencies including the State 
Land· Board, the Department of Natural Resources and 
Conservation, and the Department of Health and 
Environmental Sciences. It is too early to ascertain whether 
the requiring of several approvals guarantees effective state 
control of development or whether fragmentation of 
authority makes the state vulnerable to "divide-and-
conquer" strategies from alliances of industry and federal 
agencies. 
Montana's relations with neighboring states are similarly 
complicated. The energy resources issue could either divide 
the western states or produce a regional consensus regarding 
the best response to national pressures. In this respect, the 
situation is similar to Alberta's relationships with 
neighboring provinces of British Columbia and 
Saskatchewan in which a single solution has not been agreed 
upon. A unified position among U.S. senators from the 
western plains and Rocky Mountain states would best 
enhance the power of the energy-producing region. Such a 
position is logical in the context of natural airsheds, 
watersheds, and the distribution of fossil fuels in the region, 
but as yet there are few signs of its emergence. 
Separate state interests could preclude future 
development of any such alliance. If Wyoming is eager to 
derive revenue from its own oil and coal, it is more likely to 
oppose Montana's position than adopt it .. Wyoming's 
interest in the use of the Yellowstone river for coal 
development would then come in sharp conflict with 
Montana's decision to assign water use priority to 
agriculture. 
If the energy question is unlikely to produce a western 
state alliance in the U.S., or a western provincial regionalism 
in Canada, it is even less likely that Montanans and 
Albertans will develop common awareness of the problems 
they share as energy-producing regions. Montanans have 
been introduced to the subject as consumers of Alberta's 
natural gas: 80% of Montana Power's natural gas supply is 
Canadian. Price increases will ultimately be passed along to 
Montana consumers and they will be affected by any change 
in Canadian export policy. Montanans, therefore, may 
already be sensitized to a possible conflicting relationship 
with Alberta and Canada. 
Prospects for Changing 
the Federal Balance 
The regional resource themes identified earlier will be 
susceptible to a variety of pressures as energy conditions 
change. Transformation of attitudes into public policy will 
be a function of the interaction of three factors: energy 
demand levels, changes in the technology of extraction, and 
ability of state/provincial governments to compete with 
other levels of government. Lacking the latter, a subunit may 
find its basic position in the federal system significantly 
altered. 
Experience suggests that demand levels are the least elastic 
part of the economic equation. Barring changes in the 
American attitude toward growth, supply will continue to be 
adjusted to demand, rather than the reverse-as long as the 
finite nature of supply is accorded minor importance in 
policy making. Canada's present capacity to meet demand 
with indigenous supplies puts it in a better position than the 
United States which needs to search for additional supplies 
at progressively greater costs. Economic development could, 
however, produce changes in resource policy. For example, 
expansion of secondary industry in Alberta or Montana 
might promote attitudes favoring utilization of resources 
within the province or state. 
Developments in the technology of resource extraction 
could have a potentially greater impact. Reduction of 
extraction costs will probably lead to an increase in resource 
exploitation. It is possible, however, that technological 
advances in one area will not be transferrable to others. 
Thus, a commitment to large-scale development of either 
coal, or oil shale, or oil sands could be made to the relative 
exclusion of the other resources. Increased availability of 
domestic sources could reduce the U.S. pressure for 
development of Canadian resources or for construction of 
the Mackenzie pipeline. Curtailment of Alberta natural gas 
imports could force Montana into gasifying its coal for 
internal use. 
If a commitment is made to develop extensively the coal-
related energy industry in Montana, and the state is unable 
to control rates of growth, popular attitudes may change 
accordingly. The state may abandon or modify its 
environmental protection stance to adopt a strategy of 
economic advantage. Montanans may become resigned to 
the fact that the resources will probably be utilized and 
conclude that they should make the best of it by 
concentrating on the potential for additional revenue. 
Recent events suggest that Montana's position is already 
beginning to shift- that Montanans are realizing the state 
must accommodate itself to external pressures. Governor 
Judge has attempted to establish standards below which 
Montana must not fall. For the next five years, coal can be 
mined and shipped out for use in industrialized areas as long 
as state reclamation standards are met. But leases will not be 
granted to mine coal for use in massive conversion facilities 
which will degrade Montana's air and water.10 
This position represents a fair compromise in terms of the 
obligation of the state to the nation under principles of 
cooperative federalism. Like Alberta, Montana must adjust 
to the reality that it does-not have absolute control over 
energy resources within its own boudaries and that national 
energy needs are irresistible. The issue is not whether the 
sources should be left in the ground but how and to what 
extent they are going to be exploited. 
The 1973 Montana Utility Siting Act provides the 
opportunity to reject construction of a conversion facility if 
energy demands do not warrant it. The question of whose 
demands is the crux of the issue. The decision is somewhat 
simplified by the provision that coal for energy use outside 
the state cannot be converted within the state. Montana may 
have an obligation to share its energy resources, but it should 
not be expected to degrade its own air and water in the 
process. 
In the area of natural gas, Montana's position is similar to 
Canada's petroleum situation: both are theoretically self-
sufficient. While Montana Power imports natural gas to 
meet indigenous demand, developments in the Tiger Ridge 
area are marked for interstate commerce. If further 
importation becomes financially prohibitive, the state may 
become "resource isolationist" about its own gas even 
though production of synthetic gas from coal would result in 
additional environmental degradation. There are no easy 
answers: Montana's position on energy resources is likely to 
become even more complicated. 
Alberta, on the other hand, will exhaust its traditional 
petroleum reserves in the not-:-too-distant future. It will then 
face the dilemma of developing the Athabasca oil sands, 
posing the same environmental questions as strip mining of 
coal in Montana. It is doubtful that Albertans will become 
more environmentally conscious since they have become 
dependent on high levels of tax revenues from energy 
extraction. On the other hand, Canada's own domestic 
energy demands may restrict Alberta's prerogatives within 
the federal system. It will not be a question of whether the oil 
sands will be developed, but who will develop them when 
and for what purpose. 
In the short run, federal structures will determine the 
scope and degree of energy resource development in both the 
U.S. and Canada. In the long run, however, it is more likely 
that the constellation of forces surrounding energy 
development will result in increased centralization of 
governmental authority, especially since national prosperity 
is dependent on abundent resources. Such developments 
may be yet another example to support Riker's argument 
regarding the growing irrelevance of contemporary 
federalism. 
For some time energy policy will continue to be made 
within the context of the present federal division of power. In 
a very real sense, the future of Canada and the U.S. will 
depend upon how well these systems work. A comparison of 
the Canadian and American experiences should provide 
insight into energy resource development in other 
governmental settings in different parts of the world, 
including international organizations. The period of 
resource abundance and resulting profligacy is over. 
Political systems will now be called upon to an ever 
increasing extent to make hard and often unpleasant 
decisions. 
Lessons from the Federal Experience 
The sanguine expectations of the Stockholm Con-
ference- that awareness of growing scarcity of world 
resources would promote cooperative saving and sharing 
among nations-have been severely jolted. Instead we are 
witnessing an international "tragedy of the commons"11 
wherein each nation attempts to maximize its own 
advantage with little regard for the needs of other nations. If 
consensual societies such as those of Canada and the United 
States cannot avoid substantial erosion of their federal 
systems in resolving regional resource conflicts, it can hardly 
be expected that a global community of interest will emerge. 
Developments related to energy problems are also 
inconsistent with the patterns and expectations of economic 
modernization. The rise of resource regionalism constitutes 
an interruption in the usual evolution of an industrual 
society. Modern industrual organization tends to de-
emphasize sectional or regional differences in favor of a 
uniform and integrated whole. In the early stages of 
development, national policies gave priority to the 
populating and economic development of the western areas 
of the United States and Canada. Strong sectional or 
regional differences resulted in both countries but have 
persisted longer in Canada. The U.S. more nearly 
approximates the model of an advanced industrial society in 
which processses of assimilation, urbanization, mobility and 
mass communication have removed many of the subnational 
territorial aspects of internal conflict. 
If an advanced industrial society is suddenly faced with 
conditions of scarcity which threaten one of its most 
important characteristics-a sustained growth economy-it 
may discover that sectional problems were never really 
eliminated but only subordinated. The possibility that 
Canada and the United States may now be approaching a 
situation in which latent regionalism will reassert itself 
merits examination. Especially in Canada, provincial 
boundaries reinforce linguistic, ethnic, regional or historical 
differences that affect the manner in which federalism 
operates. Now, as energy resources are developed, territorial 
differences are more directly related to properties of the land 
itself. 
Energy resource regionalism is a phenomenon that 
federalism may or may not be able to handle. If Montanans 
and Albertans concede that efforts to preserve their 
autonomy are futile, the federal structure may atrophy 
further and the system survive in form only. Comparable 
development of resource isolationism on an international 
scale could spell disaster because the organizational 
framework at this level is nothing more than extension of the 
sovereign states that make up the world community. 
Conflict over the world's resources will be the ultimate test of 
the capacity of nations to transcend the limitations of this 
framework. 
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